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Abstract
Purpose – For half a century, neuroscientists have used Shannon Information Theory to calculate
“information transmitted,” a hypothetical measure of how well neurons “discriminate” amongst
stimuli. Neuroscientists’ computations, however, fail to meet even the technical requirements for
credibility. Ultimately, the reasons must be conceptual. That conclusion is confirmed here, with crucial
implications for neuroscience. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach – Shannon Information Theory depends upon a physical model,
Shannon’s “general communication system.” Neuroscientists’ interpretation of that model is
scrutinized here.
Findings – In Shannon’s system, a recipient receives a message composed of symbols. The symbols
received, the symbols sent, and their hypothetical occurrence probabilities altogether allow calculation
of “information transmitted.” Significantly, Shannon’s system’s “reception” (decoding) side physically
mirrors its “transmission” (encoding) side. However, neurons lack the “reception” side; neuroscientists
nonetheless insisted that decoding must happen. They turned to Homunculus, an internal humanoid
who infers stimuli from neuronal firing. However, Homunculus must contain a Homunculus, and so on
ad infinitum – unless it is super-human. But any need for Homunculi, as in “theories of consciousness,”
is obviated if consciousness proves to be “emergent.”
Research limitations/implications – Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted” indicates, at best,
how well neuroscientists themselves can use neuronal firing to discriminate amongst the stimuli given
to the research animal.
Originality/value – A long-overdue examination unmasks a hidden element in neuroscientists’ use of
Shannon Information Theory, namely, Homunculus. Almost 50 years’ worth of computations are
recognized as irrelevant, mandating fresh approaches to understanding “discriminability.”
Keywords Information theory, Brain, Homunculus, Neuron, Observer, Symmetry
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In Cybernetics, Wiener (1961, p. vii) stated that “The role of information and the
technique of measuring and transmitting information constitute a whole discipline for
the engineer, for the neuroscientist, for the psychologist, and for the sociologist.”
Sociology aside, psychologists have, for 64 years, used the discrete summations from
Shannon Information Theory (Shannon, 1948) to quantify “information transmitted”
(Garner and Hake, 1951). The latter is presented in quotation marks to differentiate
it from Shannon’s own Information Transmitted, which is unambiguous (Nizami,
2010, 2011a, b, 2013). The maximum of psychologists’ “information transmitted,”
the so-called “channel capacity,” is actually memory capacity (Nizami, 2010,
2011a, b, 2013).
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However, Shannon’s summations have also been used by neuroscientists, after
Werner and Mountcastle (1965), to quantify the neuroscience version of “information
transmitted,” defined as “the ability of [physiological sensory] receptors (or other
signal-processing elements) to transmit information about stimulus parameters” (Smith
et al., 1983, p. 82). Here “information transmitted” proves to be entirely uninformative,
even if stimulus-evoked counts of neuronal voltage spikes can be worked backward to
infer the hypothetical evoking stimuli – which is a probabilistic process (Nizami,
2014a). Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted” nonetheless continues to influence
cognitive science, making it deserving of long-overdue scrutiny. An unexamined core
issue of the neuroscience approach is: how neuroscientists interpreted the model
system underlying Shannon’s Information Theory, his “general communication
system.” That scrutiny reveals that: Shannon himself missed a component inherent
to his own system, the observer; neuroscientists in fact replaced the observer by
Homunculus, an anthropomorphic entity within the animal’s brain, to “decode”
neuronal firing; Homunculus is an impossibility; and neuroscientists’ “information
transmitted” (and, by the same token, similar discrimination measures such as Signal
Detection Theory d′; Green and Swets, 1966/1988) reveals, at best, how well
neuroscientists themselves can (on average) discriminate among stimuli by using the
animal’s stimulus-evoked neuronal firing. Ultimately we are forced to question what,
if anything, we can infer about sensation from spike trains of sensory neurons.
Nonetheless, there is a phenomenon that incorporates sensation, namely consciousness
itself, which could conceivably be “emergent,” a second-order cybernetics concept.
2. Shannon’s “general communication system”
Figure 1 recapitulates Shannon’s “general communication system” (Shannon, 1948).
As Shannon explained, it involves “An information source which produces a message or
sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal,” “A transmitter
which operates on the message in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission
over the channel,” a channel, where “The channel is merely the medium used to transmit
the signal from transmitter to receiver,” a receiver, where “The receiver ordinarily
performs the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the
message from the signal,” and a destination, where “The destination is the person
(or thing) for whom the message is intended” (Shannon, 1948, all original italics).
Noise
Noise Source
Message
(symbols
sent)
Received
message
(symbols
received)
“The System”
Channel
Transmitter
(encoder) Receiver(decoder)
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Sent messages consist of symbols, for example letters arranged into words and then
into sentences (Shannon, 1948). The symbols, and the meaningful groupings that they
make, have different probabilities of being used, and hence of being sent. Knowing
those probabilities is one requirement for computation of the information transmitted
in a message (Shannon, 1948). Nizami (2010, 2011a, b, 2013, 2014a), among others, has
summarized the relevant algebra.
In Shannon’s system, signal distortion was imagined as caused by “noise” added to
the transmitted signal within the channel. In reality, the conversion of messages to
signals, and of received signals to received messages, is not distortion-free, and
Shannon did admit that “at one of the terminals [sic], the signal may be perturbed by
noise” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p. 34), although noise was still presumably added.
In sensory systems, however, noise has been found to be multiplicative rather than
additive (e.g. Lillywhite, 1981; Prucnal and Teich, 1982; Manahilov et al., 2004; Klein,
2006; Wojtczak and Viemeister, 2008; for a list of other relevant papers, see Medina,
2011). Altogether, when all possible electrical sources of signal distortion are accounted
for, Shannon’s system is symmetric about an imaginary vertical axis in the middle of
Figure 1. That is, Shannon’s system’s right-hand-side is physically a reflection of its
left-hand-side. That symmetry will prove important to the following arguments.
Note that in cognitive science, the terms “symbols sent” and “symbols received”
were sometimes replaced, respectively, by the terms “events” and “outcomes.”
3. Why use Shannon Information Theory in neuroscience?
Applying a sensory stimulus to an organism such as a man or a Guinea pig, which has
peripheral sensory organs, may evoke firing of voltage spikes in the neurons leading
brain-wards. The applied stimulus itself might be changeable along a single continuum
(i.e. a characteristic such as intensity), or might be changeable along many continua
simultaneously, for example those that altogether result in a Gestalt such as a face.
Regardless, any measure of the stimulus-evoked neuronal response (such as the
number of voltage spikes, or the mean interval between them) will have a different
value during (some given sub-interval of) each repetition of a stimulus. Over stimulus
repetitions, then, the likelihood that the neuronal-response measure’s value lies within
any two limits can, for infinitely close limits, be approximated by a probability density
function, having a mean value and a variance. The mean value systematically changes
as the stimulus characteristic(s) likewise change. More than one (usually neighboring)
neuron can be examined simultaneously (e.g. see Averbeck et al., 2003); regardless, the
conclusions reached presently apply equally well to one neuron, or to many.
The inherent “confusion” of neuronal firing was taken by neuroscientists to reflect
the noisiness of the Shannon channel (which is what Shannon’s Information
Transmitted effectively quantifies). If changing a characteristic of a stimulus (e.g. its
intensity) caused a change (in the same direction) in the mean value of some
statistically distributed feature of the spike-train, then the respective set of stimuli
became Shannon “events” (“symbols sent”) and the respective differing spike-train
responses became “received signals.”
4. Shannon’s missing piece: the observer
Contrast the above concepts to that of Shannon’s “general communication system”
(Figure 1), in which the string of received symbols (“outcomes”) is examined by a
recipient at the destination. Who, to neuroscientists, is the recipient? This question
proves crucial, as detailed below. Shannon Information Transmitted can only be
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computed by knowing the received symbols, and two other things, starting with what
symbols were sent – known by the sender at the source, but not by the recipient.
Not known, that is, unless the sender and recipient are the same person, the observer.
If the observer also knows the probabilities of sending each different symbol, then the
observer can compute the Information Transmitted.
Figure 2 shows the observer, in a version of Figure 1 which also emphasizes the
aforementioned symmetry of Shannon’s system.
Of neuroscience papers that present “information transmitted,” few ever discuss the
underlying concepts. Neuroscientists actually imagined themselves as sampling a
system, the experimenter being part of the “environment of the system” (Walter and
Gardiner, 1970, p. 344), not part of the system itself. Figure 3 illustrates this notion. The
Observer
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message
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message
The System
Message receiving,
decoding,
and reading
Message making,
encoding,
and transmitting
Notes: The arrow pointing towards the observer from the left
emphasize that, even when not being the sender, the observer
knows what the message is
Figure 2.
After Figure 1: the
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same is evident in Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code (Rieke et al., 1997). Spikes is
devoted to the application of “information theory” to sensory neuronal firing. Tellingly,
the book lacks any illustration of its authors’ operational interpretation of Shannon’s
“general communication system,” containing only a copy of Shannon’s original (and
incomplete) box-and-line diagram.
Note in Figure 3 that Shannon’s system’s “reception” side (Figure 2: right-hand-side) is
absent. That is, there is no conversion of “signal” back to “message” (“decoding”)
in the research animal’s body. For “information transmitted” to have meaning, then, a
substitute is required for the missing parts, and neuroscientists found one: Homunculus.
5. Ladies and gentlemen: Homunculus
Neuroscientists portrayed Homunculus as a miniature “being,” a small copy of its host
animal, living within each animal’s head, but without the animal’s awareness.
Homunculus sees the neuronal voltage spikes, and hence infers the stimulus, although
the literature does not describe how (more below). Figure 4 illustrates Homunculus’
role. Hypothetically, Homunculus can (by unknown means) “decode” the spike train
and thus infer the stimulus. Homunculus might even, if having a brain, “remember” the
spike trains evoked over repeated presentations of the stimulus, in order to associate
one with the other and hence possibly improve discriminability. But can Homunculus
therefore quantify discriminability by computing “information transmitted”? No, not
without knowing the probabilities of the stimuli, which are decided by the experimenter
and which Homunculus, if trapped within the animal, cannot know.
Note that Homunculus needs legs (or their equivalents) in order to roam the brain;
arms, in order to isolate particular neurons; and eyes, with which to observe spike
firing. To coordinate these capabilities – and possibly to remember the observations, in
order to better “discriminate” between stimuli in the future – Homunculus needs a
brain. But that brain needs a sub-Homunculus within it, to perform computations on
“The System”
Experimenter
Stimuli
(events)
Message making,
encoding,
and transmitting
Spike counts
(outcomes)
Message receiving,
decoding,
and reading
Homunculus
Figure 4.
Homunculus and its
role, according to
neuroscientists
(see text)
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behalf of Homunculus – and so on and so forth, to an infinity of Homunculi. An infinity
of Homunculi is absurd. Further, inferring any stimulus might require infinities of time
and/or energy. To unquestionably avoid infinities requires avoiding sub-Homunculi –
leaving a single super-human Homunculus, the obvious candidate being a man-made
invention called God.
But superstitions are unacceptable. Who plays Homunculus, then? The obvious
candidate is the experimenter. But the experimenter does not know “the neural code,”
and therefore cannot “decode” the spike train; the experimenter can only make
inferences (Nizami, 2014a). Figure 5 shows that no-one, therefore, takes Homunculus’
place. Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted” hence indicates, at best, how well
neuroscientists can (on average) discriminate among the presented stimuli, through the
research animal’s neuronal firing.
Unfortunately, neuroscientists seem to see nothing of this.
6. Homunculus in the popular book Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code
Few writings on the use of Information Theory in neuroscience discuss its conceptual
basis. One of the few that does is the book Spikes (Rieke et al., 1997), which (according to
GoogleScholar) has been cited 2,500 times to-date. The prefatory remarks therein, along
with the first chapter, lay the groundwork for a subsequent plethora of equations and
computations. Homunculus appears early on. On page xvii of Spikes, the page
preceding the first chapter, Rieke et al. (1997) introduce the “disquieting figure of a little
hobgoblin sitting up aloft in the cerebral hemisphere.” Rieke et al. (1997, p. 1) then leave
the brain and return to the laboratory, noting that there can be “an observer outside the
cell” who sees “the electrical signals from individual cells [i.e. neurons].” Rieke et al.
(1997) swiftly return to the inner observer, “a little man […] who observes the responses
of his own sensory neurons and finally forms the percepts that the organism
experiences” (p. 13). Rieke et al. (1997) then seem to unify the observer-in-the-lab with
The System
Experimenter
Stimuli
(events)
Spike counts
(outcomes)
Message making,
encoding,
and transmitting
Figure 5.
The actual system
of a sensory
neuroscience
experiment (see text,
and compare to
Figures 2 and 4)
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the observer-in-the-brain: “we place ourselves, inevitably, in the position of the
homunculus – we observe the responses of sensory neurons and try to decide what
these responses could mean to the organism” (p. 13). Rieke et al. (1997) are now a single
thought away from proposing that Homunculus and the experimenter are one and the
same. Then, remarkably, they change their minds (p. 14):
It is easy to imagine that the task of the homunculus is trivial – after all, he just watches a
projected image of the world as it flashes through the brain. But this projected image is
encoded in the patterns of action potentials generated by the sensory neurons. It is not at all
clear what the homunculus would have to do, even in principle, to make sense out of these
encoded data. We propose that “understanding the neural code” means that we would know
how to make sense out of the bewildering array of spike trains streaming in from the sense
organs: If we understand the code, we can function as the homunculus [sic].
Notwithstanding the apparently unselfconscious expression “make sense,” Rieke et al.
(1997, p. 14) have placed Homunculus (at least momentarily) within the brain, tasking
the neuroscientists with “seeing” whatever Homunculus “sees.” Rieke et al. then
mention Green and Swets (1966/1988), and the latter’s two-alternative psychophysical
discrimination experiments (leading to d′), which call for Homunculus to function in
“a world of two alternatives” (Rieke et al., 1997, p. 15). Rieke et al. duly note the contrived
simplicity of such experiments. Rieke et al. then return to the natural world, in which the
animal does not follow the laboratory procedure (used to build d′, for example) of
averaging “signals” over relatively long time periods. Rather, the animal has a Homunculus
who must “give a sort of running commentary or simultaneous translation” (Rieke et al.,
1997, p. 15) of the animal’s surroundings. Once again, the brain is the seat of Homunculus.
Nonetheless, Rieke et al. (1997) then declare that “the statistically sophisticated homunculus
would report confidence levels on his estimates of what is happening in the world” (p. 16), a
task which, requiring statistical tools, would make Homunculus the equivalent of a
laboratory personage equipped with textbooks and software and computers. Rieke et al.
(1997) subsequently explain that “We [i.e. the experimenters] place ourselves in the position
of the homunculus, monitoring the spike trains of sensory neurons” (p. 16). Once again,
Homunculus is the equivalent of a laboratory personage. But there is more than one
Homunculus now: “Out of many possible homunculi, there is one that tells us as much as
possible about the world given the noise in the spike train data itself” (Rieke et al. 1997,
p. 16). But which one? Only one can be dealt with: “Most of this book is about the problem
of an impoverished homunculus who looks at the spike train of just one neuron at a time”
(Rieke et al. 1997, p. 16). Is this particular Homunculus now the experimenter?
Rieke et al. (1997) confuse things further: they declare that “decoding” is “the
problem solved by our homunculus” (p. 17). Rieke et al. fail to explain why a
Homunculus at the brain would have to “decode” anything, given that spike trains
provide the impressions of the world. Only an out-of-body laboratory Homunculus
would conceivably need to “decode” spike trains – that is, in order to experience
sensation as a research animal does.
Among the few neuroscience publications which do discuss the conceptual basis
of their use of Information Theory is Walter and Gardiner (1970). They rejected
Homunculus outright: “It may be thought that the parts of the brain whose function we
have been formulating are merely subservient to some higher center, perhaps inhabited
by a ‘little green man’, who really runs that brain […] [but] we have not found the
concept of a higher and qualitatively different type of brain function to be a necessary
hypothesis” (Walter and Gardiner, 1970, p. 371).
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7. On the infinite regression of Homunculi
The present author uncovered the concept of an infinite regression of Homunculi within
the human mind following upon his discovery of a hidden infinite regression of
Homunculi within putative sensory receptors (Nizami, 2009a) in an erroneous
multi-paper model of perception authored by K.H. Norwich (scrutinized in Nizami,
2009b, 2011b; and elsewhere). After the present author completed the first draft of the
present manuscript, he discovered the literature on Consciousness, which provides a
variety of relevant papers. For example, Kenny (1971), among others, notes that the
infinite regression was recognized centuries ago. That is, René Descartes, quoted in
Kenny (1971, p. 66), warned against the internal Homunculus who “sees” images for us
within the brain (a phenomenon now called the “Cartesian theatre”). Kenny (1971, p. 68)
notes a passage from vision scientist R.L. Gregory from 1966 that also warns against
the use of the Homunculus in vision – while, remarkably, inherently assuming the
Homunculus! Altogether, Kenny (1971) demonstrates that the infinite regression is
difficult to avoid. This proves prophetic, as follows.
Attneave (1961) seeks to dismiss the problem of an infinite regression of homunculi.
He declares that “If a homunculus exists it must certainly be composed of neurons”
(p. 778). Then, “We fall into a regress only if we try to make the homunculus do
everything” (Attneave, 1961, p. 778; original italics). Further, “The moment we specify
certain processes that occur outside the homunculus, we are merely classifying or
partitioning psychoneural functions; the classification may be crude, but it is not
in itself regressive” (Attneave, 1961, p. 778, original italics). Attneave (1961, p. 778)
continues: “Indeed, one might even hypothesize a series of concentric or nested
homunculi without falling into a regress, provided each contained an outer layer of
functions not contained in the next smaller one.” To explicate a Homunculus, Attneave
(1961) borrows from a contemporaneous paper (in the same volume) by Bullock; in
Attneave’s words (p. 778), “For any given behavior there must be at least one neuron that
‘decides’, on the basis of activity in receptors and other neurons, whether to initiate that
behavior or not” (original internal quotation marks). Therefore “There may be as many
‘homunculi’ of this sort as there are coherent behavior patterns” (Attneave, 1961, p. 778;
original internal quotation marks). That is, to Attneave, a Homunculus is a controller
(a term used many times in the subsequent literature), one that can be physically outside
of, but connecting with, the “behaviors” – that is, the “functions” – that it controls.
The Attneave (1961) model of the nested Homunculi is used by Dennett (1981) and
by others (e.g. Crick and Koch, 2000, 2003). Attneave’s (1961) claims beg a crucial
question: how has Attneave managed a seemingly impossible task, namely, maintaining
a finite number of Homunculi – while avoiding an infinite regression of Homunculi for
one or more (potentially, each and every) Homunculus? Attneave’s (1961) “nested” model
is remarkably vague, consisting of the few sentences mentioned above. Perhaps it
intentionally lacks detail. Attneave himself is no longer available to provide interpretation.
In fact, Attneave’s (1961) nesting scheme can be proven to be nonsense, but room is
not available here. Essentially, Attneave “solves” the infinite regression by ignoring
it. Dennett (1981) likewise imagines a committee of Homunculi who perform functions.
Each Homunculus is allegedly composed of less intelligent Homunculi, all performing
functions, until reaching a level at which each one “can be replaced by a machine.” But this
is just Attneave’s model without the “non-controlled” functions; that is, it is Attneave’s
model with all functions being Homunculus-controlled.
The model of Attneave (1961) and Dennett (1981) seems unconvincing. However,
there is a possible Cybernetics approach to the removal of Homunculi, namely,
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a general-systems-theory approach, such as emergence, which closely relates to
self-organization (see e.g. chapters 6, 23, and 24 of Ramage and Shipp, 2009).
For example, to von der Malsburg (1997), eliminating the Homunculus is inseparable
from explaining Consciousness, but “Consciousness doesn’t reside in any specialized
faculty of mind or localized structure of the brain, but is rather a cooperative
phenomenon of the whole brain or mind” (p. 203). To make his point, von der Malsburg
(1997, p. 203) quotes John (1976, p. 1): “I believe that ‘mind’, under which rubric are
subsumed such phenomena as consciousness, subjective experience, the concept of self,
and self-awareness, is an emergent property of sufficiently complex and appropriately
organized matter” (original italics, and original internal quotation marks).
8. Final discussion and conclusions
Shannon (1948) provided equations quantifying Information Transmitted for a
physical model which he called a “general communication system.” Psychologists
(starting with Garner and Hake, 1951) and neuroscientists (starting with Werner and
Mountcastle, 1965) independently re-labeled Shannon’s system and assumed that their
consequent “information transmitted” computations were valid information measures
for entire individuals or for individual neurons, respectively (see Nizami, 2010, 2011a, b,
2013, 2014a). They were not (same citations). In particular, neuroscientists believed that
Shannon’s Information Transmitted measured how well neurons “discriminate” among
stimuli. But no neuronal system is a Shannon “general communication system”;
Shannon (1948) himself misled-the-way by labeling as “general” a system that was
specific to telecommunications.
Shannon’s system has a “reception” (decoding) side which physically mirrors
its “transmission” (encoding) side, but actual neurons lack the “reception” side.
Neuroscientists nonetheless insisted that decoding must happen. Hence, they turned to
Homunculus, an internal being who allegedly infers stimuli from neuronal firing. But
Homunculus is physically impossible. Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted”
calculations (and others, such as Signal Detection Theory d′) have therefore, at best,
revealed how well neuroscientists, not research animals, can (on average) discriminate
among stimuli through the animal’s neuronal firing. Importantly, the concept of
Homunculus (used by Attneave, 1961; Dennett, 1981; and Rieke et al., 1997, among
many others) appears in “theories of consciousness,” but is obviated if consciousness
proves to be “emergent.”
Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted” computations are irrelevant to the
animal’s experience. This explains a hypothetically crippling aspect of single-neuron
firing, namely, an “information transmitted” of less than 1 bit per stimulus, representing
an inability to distinguish among merely two choices (e.g. light and dark). This absurd
result has arisen for vision (e.g. Optican and Richmond, 1987; McClurkin et al., 1991;
Tovee et al., 1993; Gochin et al., 1994; Heller et al., 1995; Tovee and Rolls, 1995; Sugase
et al., 1999; Wiener et al., 2001; Averbeck et al., 2003, Figure 5; Osborne et al., 2004,
Figures 3, 7), for touch (e.g. Arabzadeh et al., 2004, 2006; Saal et al., 2009; Farfán et al.,
2011), for taste (e.g. Rolls et al., 2010), for smell (e.g. Rolls et al., 1996), and for hearing
(e.g. Gehr et al., 2000; Lu and Wang, 2004; Nelken et al., 2005). Ironically, measures of
“information transmitted” in peripheral neurons had once been distinctly larger
(e.g. Werner and Mountcastle, 1965; Darian-Smith et al., 1968; Kenton and Kruger, 1971;
Smith et al., 1983), quite close in fact to what had been found in psychology. All along,
however, psychologists had inadvertently been measuring short-term memory
capacity rather than measuring informational “channel capacity” (see Nizami, 2011a,
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2013; confirming a six-decades-old suspicion of Miller, 1956). Memory is not a known
property of peripheral sensory neurons; hence, the agreement between physiology and
psychology was extraordinary. Or as Somjen (1972, p. 312) drily noted, “The possibility
that this correspondence might be fortuitous cannot be dismissed without further
study.” In fact, fortuity had been assured by various means; Walter and Gardiner (1970,
p. 364) noted, for example, that Werner and Mountcastle (1965) “chose the stimulus
pattern with unusual care.” Indeed, Werner and Mountcastle and their contemporaries
listed above had jury-rigged the experiments (stimuli, recording conditions, choice of
neuron and its adaptation state, etc.) to give the desired results (Nizami, 2014a).
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